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Polylogism

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Polylogism is the belief that different groups of people reason in fundamentally different ways (coined from Greek poly 'many' + logos 'logic').[1] The term is attributed to Ludwig von Mises,[2] who claimed that it described Marxism and other class based social philosophies.[3] In the Misesian sense of the term, a polylogist ascribes different forms of "logic" to different groups, which may include groups based on race,[1][4] gender, class, or time period. At the time of his writing, the primary distinction was that drawn by the Nazi's between "Jewish science" and "German Science," although he created the term to highlight the similarities with Marxist class analysis also positing that "Bourgeoise economics" was different than "Scientific socialism" (economics) due to the dialectical nature of class.

Types of polylogism

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A polylogist would claim that different groups reason in fundamentally different ways: they use different "logics" for deductive inference. Normative polylogism is the claim that these different logics are equally valid. Descriptive polylogism is an empirical claim about different groups, but a descriptive polylogism need not claim equal validity for different "logics".[5] That is, a descriptive polylogist may insist on a universally valid deductive logic while claiming as an empirical matter that some groups use other (incorrect) reasoning strategies.

An adherent of polylogism in the Misesian sense would be a normative polylogist. A normative polylogist might approach an argument by demonstrating how it was correct within a particular logical construct, even if it were incorrect within the logic of the analyst. As Mises noted "this never has been and never can be attempted by anybody."

Proletarian logic

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The term 'proletarian logic' is sometimes taken as evidence of polylogism.[citation needed] This term is usually traced back to Joseph Dietzgen in his 11th letter on logic.[6][7] Dietzgen is the now obscure philosophical monist of the 19th century who coined the term 'dialectical materialism' and was praised by communist figures such as Karl Marx and V. I. Lenin.[8] His work has received modern attention primarily from the philosopher Bertell Ollman. As a monist, Dietzgen insists on a unified treatment of mind and matter. As Simon Boxley puts it, for Dietzgen "thought is as material an event as any other". This means that logic too has "material" underpinnings.[further explanation needed] (But note that Dietzgen's "materialism" was explicitly not a physicalism.)

Racialist polylogism

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Racialist polylogism is often identified with the Nazi era.[9] It has been proposed that the ferment around Einstein's theory of relativity is an example of racialist polylogism.[9] Some of the criticisms of relativity theory were mixed with racialist resistance that characterized the physics as an embodiment of Jewish ideology. (For example, Nobel Prize winner Philipp Lenard claimed scientific thought was conditioned by "blood and race", and he accused Werner Heisenberg of teaching "Jewish physics".[10]) However this appears to be an argument ad hominem, not polylogism. Modern examples of supposed racialist polylogism are generally misleading. For example, US Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor has been accused of racialist polylogism for suggesting that a "wise Latina" might come to different legal conclusions than a white male. Although generally given the interpretation that life experience can influence one's ability to understand the practical implications of a legal argument, some commentators suggested that Sotomayor supported the idea that Latinas have a unique "logic".[11][12]

Comparison to Kuhn's incommensurability

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Some proponents of polylogism argue that different groups may indeed develop distinct scientific theories and frameworks, drawing on the work of Thomas Kuhn in "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions." Kuhn introduced the concept of paradigm shifts, suggesting that scientific progress is not a linear accumulation of knowledge but rather occurs through revolutionary changes in paradigms. According to this view, a paradigm encompasses the accepted theories, methods, and standards within a scientific community, and when a paradigm shift occurs, the new framework is often incommensurable with the old one—meaning that the two paradigms cannot be directly compared or reconciled.

In this context, proponents of polylogism argue that different cultural, social, or ideological groups may operate under entirely distinct paradigms, leading to divergent scientific theories and understandings. The incommensurability of these paradigms implies that what one group considers scientific truth may not be seen as such by another, as each group’s theories are deeply embedded in their specific conceptual frameworks and assumptions. Therefore, they suggest that scientific theories can indeed be different for different groups, not merely as a matter of interpretation but as fundamentally distinct ways of understanding the world.

This argument posits that just as Kuhn described incommensurability within the evolution of scientific thought, similar dynamics can occur across different social or cultural groups. This notion challenges the idea of objective, universal scientific truths, proposing instead that the context in which knowledge is produced can significantly influence the nature and interpretation of that knowledge.

The two ideas are not mutually exclusive, however, as Kuhn's concept of the incommensurability of different paradigms differs from the Misesian notion of polylogism. Kuhn's idea suggests that scientists working within different paradigms are often unable to fully understand or evaluate each other's work due to differing foundational assumptions. In contrast, Mises' attack on polylogism refers to the belief that different groups, such as races or classes, think differently. The Nazis did not reject Einstein's work because they had a fundamentally different scientific framework; rather, they dismissed his conclusions because they believed that, as a Jew, he was inherently incapable of sound reasoning.[9] This was not a matter of different scientific paradigms but of a prejudiced ideology that disregarded the validity of his work based on racial grounds.

To use Kuhn’s terminology, one could frame the Misesian concept of polylogism as the belief that members of different races or classes are inherently unable to contribute effectively to solving puzzles within the framework of ‘normal science,’ due to presumed deficiencies tied to their identity. Polylogists argue that these groups operate under fundamentally different cognitive frameworks, which preclude them from engaging in the same scientific paradigm as others. Alternatively, a polylogist familiar with Kuhn might argue a certain group or classes innalienable traits force them to be stuck in certain paradigm’s long surpassed by more superior groups.

References

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  1. ^ a b Percy L. Greaves Jr. (1974). "Glossary, Panphysicalism - Pump-priming". Mises Made Easier. Retrieved 2011-01-13.
  2. ^ Perrin, Pierre (2005). "Hermeneutic economics: Between relativism and progressive polylogism". Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics. 8 (3): 21–38. doi:10.1007/s12113-005-1032-3.
  3. ^ Ludwig von Mises (18 August 2014). "Chapter 3, Section 1". Human Action (PDF) (1996 ed.). pp. 72–75.
  4. ^ Alexander Moseley (2002). A Philosophy of War. Algora Publishing. p. 239. ISBN 978-1-892941-94-7.
  5. ^ Roderick Long. "Anti-Psychologism in Economics: Wittgenstein and Mises" (PDF).
  6. ^ Emmett, Dorothy (1928). "Joseph Dietzgen: The Philosopher of Proletarian Logic". Journal of Adult Education. Vol. 3. pp. 26–35.
  7. ^ The Positive Outcome of Philosophy; Letters on Logic, Especially Democratic Proletarian Logic.
  8. ^ A Dictionary of Marxist thought
  9. ^ a b c Gimbel, Steven. Einstein's Jewish Science: Physics at the Intersection of Politics and Religion. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013.
  10. ^ Joseph W. Bendersky (2000). A history of Nazi Germany: 1919–1945. p. 140.
  11. ^ Rich Lowry. "How Sotomayor Misspoke".
  12. ^ Peter Wehner. "Judge Sotomayor, in Her Own Words".
  • Boxley, Simon, (2008), Red, Black and Green: Dietzgen's Philosophy Across the Divide. http://www.anarchist-studies-network.org.uk/documents/Conference%20Papers/Simon%20Boxley.doc
  • Ollman, B. (1976) Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
  • Ollman, B. (2003a) Dance of the Dialectic: Steps in Marx's Method, Chicago: University of Illinois Press
  • Ollman, B. (2003b) ‘Marx’s Dialectical Method is more than a Mode of Exposition: A Critique of Systematic Dialectics’ in Albritton, R. & Siloulidis, J. (Eds.) New Dialectics and Political Economy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
  • Perrin, Pierre, "Hermeneutic economics: Between relativism and progressive polylogism", Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, Volume 8, Number 3, 21–38, doi:10.1007/s12113-005-1032-3
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